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CROSS-DEBARMENT: A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
As anti-corruption initiatives around the world gain momentum,
one device for fighting corruption—debarment, or “blacklisting,”1
of corrupt or unqualified contractors and individuals2—has
emerged as an especially noteworthy tool.3  Governments and
international institutions have developed their own debarment sys-
tems, to exclude contractors that have committed certain types of
wrongs (bribery or fraud, for example) (the World Bank’s
approach),4 or, more broadly, to exclude contractors that pose
unacceptable performance or reputational risks because of bad
* Professor of Government Contract Law and Co-Director of the Government Pro-
curement Law Program, The George Washington University Law School; Of Counsel,
Arnold & Porter LLP.  Member of the New York, District of Columbia, and Virginia bars.
J.D. 1988, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A. 1984, Harvard College.  This Essay was
developed, in part, through an international symposium on suspension and debarment
held at the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. on October 9, 2012.  While the
author wishes to thank fellow members of the symposium for their insights which contrib-
uted to this Essay, the views expressed here are the author’s alone.
1. Under the U.S. federal system, for example, an agency may temporarily suspend a
contractor or may debar that firm for a fixed term. See FAR 9.406–9.407 (2011) (“Debar-
ment, Suspension, and Ineligibility”).  For simplicity, the discussion here will refer to sus-
pension and debarment collectively as “debarment.”  The term “blacklisting” is not widely
used in the U.S. federal system.
2. While debarment systems may exclude both firms and individuals from future
contracting, references here generally will be to “contractors.”
3. Although the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) does not
cite debarment as an anti-corruption tool, the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption notes that enacting states should implement
appropriate measures, such as debarment, to encourage compliance with UNCAC’s anti-
corruption requirements. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION ¶ 338 (2006).
4. This Essay focuses on the World Bank’s sanctions procedures, used for misconduct
related to World Bank-financed projects, rather than on the Bank’s internal debarment
procedures for its own “corporate” purchasing. See generally Todd J. Canni, Debarment Is No
Longer Private World Bank Business: An Examination of the Bank’s Distinct Debarment Procedures
Used for Corporate Procurements and Financed Projects, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 147 (2010) (explor-
ing Bank’s debarment procedures and recommending revisions for use in corporate pro-
curement context); Sope Williams, The Debarment of Corrupt Contractors from World Bank-
Financed Contracts, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277 (2007) (analyzing Bank’s measures requiring
debarment of corrupt suppliers from Bank-financed projects).
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acts or broken internal controls (the U.S. federal government
approach5).6
As debarment systems have matured in parallel, a policy question
has emerged: should a contractor debarred in one system be auto-
matically cross-debarred in another?7  For example, under the mul-
tilateral development banks’ current cross-debarment scheme,
when the World Bank debars a contractor, the other institutions
automatically debar that contractor.8  But when the World Bank
debars a contractor,9 should U.S. agencies—many of which sit only
a few blocks away from the World Bank’s headquarters in Washing-
ton—also debar that contractor?
Although proponents argue that this legal device, commonly
known as “cross-debarment,” would improve anti-corruption efforts
5. For brevity, references here to the suspension and debarment system used by the
federal government in the United States will simply be to the “U.S.” system.  In the United
States, the federal procurement system accounts for approximately $500 billion in
purchases each year. See Turning the Tide on Contract Spending, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET (Feb.
4, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/04/turning-tide-contract-spending.
6. See, e.g., Emily Seymour, Note, Refining the Source of the Risk: Suspension and Debar-
ment in the Post-Enron Era, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 357, 358 (2005).  For a comparison of the U.S.
and World Bank debarment systems, see Pascale H. Dubois, Domestic and International
Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud & Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension and Debar-
ment with the World Bank’s Sanctions System, 2012 U. CHI. LEG. F. 195, 197–98 (2012); see also
Stuart H. Deming, Anti-Corruption Policies: Eligibility and Debarment at the World Bank and
Regional Development Banks, 44 INT’L L. 871, 883–84 (2010); Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes & Edouard Fromageau, Balancing the Scales: The World Bank Sanctions Process
and Access to Remedies, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, 973 (2012).  The United Kingdom recently
launched a system for identifying “high risk” contractors—not to blacklist them, but to
address the higher performance risk posed by these contractors. See Strategic Supplier Risk
Management Policy (Nov. 7, 2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/80222/20121108_Strategic_Supplier_Risk_Man-
agement_Policy.pdf.
7. This concept of cross-debarment is sometimes referred to as “reciprocity.” See,
e.g., Canni, supra note 4, at 167.  While generally outside the scope of this Essay, a U.S. state R
agency may reciprocally exclude contractors that have been debarred by other states or by
the federal government. See, e.g., TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1680-05-01.01 (2005) (“This
chapter adopts a system of debarment and suspension for the [Tennessee] Department [of
Transportation].  It also provides for reciprocal exclusion of persons who have been
excluded under Federal law or the laws of other states.”); Daniel F. Toomey et al., Debar-
ment & Suspension / Edition III, BRIEFING PAPERS, Mar. 1989, at 1, 11 (“As a general rule,
states with even moderately detailed debarment provisions allow for reciprocal debarment
based on debarment in another jurisdiction.”).
8. See African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank Group & World
Bank Group, Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (Apr. 9, 2010)
[hereinafter Agreement for Mutual Enforcement], available at http://lnadbg4.adb.org/
oai001p.nsf/0/F77A326B818A19C548257853000C2B10/$FILE/cross-debarment-agree-
ment.pdf.
9. See generally Canni, supra note 4 (exploring Bank’s debarment procedures). R
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by multiplying the impact of debarment actions10—contractors
could potentially face exclusion from many systems, not just one,
when confronted with a possible debarment—it would also mark a
significant change in current practice.  While cross-debarment is
legally required among U.S. federal agencies (when one agency
debars a contractor, that contractor is barred from doing business
with all federal agencies),11 and cross-debarment is now the norm
among the World Bank and the other multilateral development
banks,12 cross-debarment between governments and other institu-
tions is not yet common.  Although one government may take
note, and make informal inquiries, when another government or
institution takes action against a contractor,13 generally govern-
ments are not bound by other governments’ or institutions’ debar-
ment decisions.14  Assessing cross-debarment therefore requires
careful consideration of potential costs and benefits.
One way to explore the costs and benefits of cross-debarment is
to assess it through the perspectives of various stakeholders15 in the
procurement and anti-corruption communities, from policymakers
to contractors.  While focusing on stakeholders’ likely views will not
resolve some of the thornier legal issues buried inside cross-debar-
ment—for example, how evidence should be shared between dif-
ferent governmental proceedings—a stakeholder analysis will allow
us to assess some of the more obvious practical and political issues
that cross-debarment may present.  To put the stakeholder analysis
10. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, Multilateral Development Banks Agree on Cross Debarment, 26
INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 255, 255 (2010).
11. FAR 9.401 (2011).
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
13. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-932, SUSPENSION AND DEBAR-
MENT: DOD HAS ACTIVE REFERRAL PROCESSES, BUT ACTION NEEDED TO PROMOTE TRANS-
PARENCY (Sept. 2012) (discussing cross-referral among U.S. agencies regarding reports of
contractor misconduct).
14. For a discussion of the impact of federal agency debarments across the federal
government, see KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34753, DEBARMENT AND SUS-
PENSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW INCLUDING RECENTLY
ENACTED AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS (Jan. 20, 2011).
15. The U.K. Department of Finance and Personnel offers this definition of “stake-
holder”:  “an individual or group that has an interest in the proposed change and can
influence or impact the success of the change.” Stakeholders, U.K. DEP’T FIN. & PERSONNEL,
http://www.dfpni.gov.uk/stakeholders (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).  The foundational work
for stakeholder analysis is R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984).  For an earlier use of stakeholder theory in procurement, see Steven L.
Schooner, Daniel I. Gordon & Jessica L. Clark, Public Procurement Systems: Unpacking Stake-
holder Aspirations and Expectations (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 1133234, May 8, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1133234.
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\45-2\JLE201.txt unknown Seq: 4 22-JUL-13 12:36
222 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 45
into context, Part II of this Essay will offer a very brief overview of
the U.S. and World Bank debarment systems.  Drawing, in part, on
potential cross-debarment between those two systems as an exam-
ple, Part III of the Essay will assess how each stakeholder group
might view this type of aggressive cross-debarment, between the
U.S. and World Bank systems.  Part IV, the conclusion, will suggest
a balance between the most radical solutions (such as automatic
cross-debarment) and tamer approaches, such as vigorous publica-
tion of the names of blacklisted contractors.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. AND WORLD BANK DEBARMENT SYSTEMS
Two systems that stand as potential candidates for cross-debar-
ment are the U.S.16 and World Bank debarment systems.
Although, as is discussed below, the two systems are fundamentally
different in many ways, they also share, in loose terms, a common
structure, in part because the World Bank system was shaped by the
U.S. model.17
The U.S. federal debarment system18 is grounded in an assess-
ment of contractor qualification—of “responsibility,” to use the
U.S. term.19  By law, debarment is not to be used as a form of pun-
ishment,20 but instead is to be used to exclude contractors that
have been convicted of certain crimes (such as bribery) or have
16. See generally Joseph D. West et al., Suspension and Debarment, BRIEFING PAPERS, Aug.
2006, at 1; David Robbins, As Suspension and Debarment Grows the National Discourse, We
Should Not Lose Sight of Broader Procurement Fraud Remedies, PROCUREMENT L., Fall 2012, at 1;
Kara M. Sacilotto & Craig Smith, Suspension and Debarment: Trends and Perspectives, PROCURE-
MENT L., Fall 2012, at 3; David Robbins et al., Path of an Investigation: How a Major Contrac-
tor’s Ethics Office and Air Force Procurement Fraud and Suspension/Debarment Apparatus Deal with
Allegations of Potential Fraud and Unethical Conduct, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 595 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Robbins et al., Path of an Investigation] (describing the U.S. debarment system).
17. See, e.g., Hans-Joachim Priess, Questionable Assumptions: The Case for Updating the
Suspension and Debarment Regimes at the Multilateral Development Banks, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
18. The discussion here focuses on discretionary debarment under the U.S. system, per
FAR 9.4 (2011)—not the mandatory debarment required for those that have violated cer-
tain statutes. See generally JOHN CIBINIC, JR. ET AL., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
457–70 (4th ed. 2011) (comparing the two types of debarment in U.S. law).  The vast
majority of U.S. federal exclusions are for statutory violations. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-739, SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT: SOME AGENCY PRO-
GRAMS NEED GREATER ATTENTION, AND GOVERNMENTWIDE OVERSIGHT COULD BE IMPROVED 7
(2011).
19. FAR 9.402(a) (2011) (“[Agencies] shall solicit offers from, award contracts to, and
consent to subcontracts with responsible contractors only.  Debarment and suspension are
discretionary actions that . . . are appropriate means to effectuate this policy.”).
20. FAR 9.402(b) (2011) (“The serious nature of debarment and suspension requires
that these sanctions be imposed only in the public interest for the Government’s protec-
tion and not for purposes of punishment.  Agencies shall impose debarment or suspension
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been shown to be in serious breach of other requirements (such as
contractual obligations), or for “any other cause of so serious or
compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of the
contractor.”21  The debarment procedures used in the U.S. system
are “as informal as is practicable,” by design, “consistent with prin-
ciples of fundamental fairness,” and are generally structured so as
to allow a contractor a fair opportunity to be heard.22  The infor-
mal proceedings mean that a contractor facing a potential debar-
ment in the U.S. system should have a meaningful opportunity to
discuss the alleged problem in detail with the debarment official,
and (if possible) to negotiate an administrative agreement as a
form of settlement.23
Within the U.S. federal procurement system, cross-debarment is
automatic: once a contractor is debarred by one agency, that con-
tractor is listed on the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) (now
part of the consolidated online System for Award Management
(SAM)), and no other federal agency may contract with the
excluded party.24  Because debarment actions are, in effect, cross-
debarments among all federal agencies,25 the Interagency Commit-
tee on Debarment and Suspension26 is authorized to resolve which
of the interested federal agencies will be the lead agency with
responsibility to initiate suspension or debarment proceedings.27
to protect the Government’s interest and only for the causes and in accordance with the
procedures set forth in this subpart.”).
21. FAR 9.406-2 (2011).
22. FAR 9.406-3 (2011) (noting that procedures “shall afford the contractor (and any
specifically named affiliates) an opportunity to submit, in person, in writing, or through a
representative, information and argument in opposition to the proposed debarment”).
23. See generally Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination and Cri-
tique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including a Discussion of the Mandatory
Disclosure Rule, the IBM Suspension, and Other Noteworthy Developments, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 547
(2009) (discussing the fairness, effectiveness, and integrity of suspension and debarment
structures under U.S. law).
24. See, e.g., Pub. L. 103-355, tit. II, § 2455, 108 Stat. 3327 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 6101 note (2006)) (“No agency shall allow a party to participate in any procurement or
nonprocurement activity if any agency has debarred, suspended, or otherwise excluded . . .
that party from participation in a procurement or nonprocurement activity.”).
25. See Exec. Order No. 12,689, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1989) (“[T]he debarment, suspension,
or other exclusion of a participant in a procurement activity under the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, or in a nonprocurement activity under regulations issued pursuant to Execu-
tive Order No. 12549, shall have government-wide effect.  No agency shall allow a party to
participate in any procurement or nonprocurement activity if any agency has debarred,
suspended, or otherwise excluded (to the extent specified in the exclusion agreement)
that party from participation in a procurement or nonprocurement activity.”).
26. See Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee, EPA http://www.epa.gov/isdc/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (committee home page).
27. See, e.g., FAR 9.402(d) (2011).
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This “lead agency” system allows the agency with the largest stake
to lead the debarment action, and, if appropriate, to enter into an
administrative agreement with the contractor, short of
debarment.28
In the U.S. system, debarment officials have broad discretion to
negotiate administrative agreements with contractors that can show
that they are presently responsible.29  The informality of the debar-
ment procedures means, in practice, that contractors’ representa-
tives (generally attorneys) have extensive opportunities to discuss a
proposed settlement with the debarment official,30 an administra-
tive agreement that will typically require the contractor to take
extensive remedial measures and, perhaps, to agree to long-term
monitoring.  The U.S. debarring official is also called upon,
though, to coordinate the debarment remedy with other civil and
criminal penalties being sought by the government,31 and, as a sta-
tistical matter, administrative agreements are used in a relatively
small percentage of cases.32  If the parties cannot resolve the mat-
ter, and the contractor is debarred, that decision may be chal-
lenged by the debarred contractor in U.S. district court, under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).33  The courts, however, will
overturn a debarment under the APA only if the debarment was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in violation of
law34—a highly deferential standard of review.
The World Bank debarment system is more rigidly structured
than the U.S. system and is far more adjudicative in nature.35  The
World Bank system, unlike the U.S. system, is by its terms a “sanc-
tions” system, intended to sanction contractors that commit certain
28. See, e.g., Richard J. Bednar et al., United States, in SELF-CLEANING IN PUBLIC PRO-
CUREMENT LAW, at 175, 175–81 (Hermann Punder et al. eds., 2009).
29. See generally Robbins et al., Path of an Investigation, supra note 16, at 606 (discussing R
how the U.S. Air Force evaluates suspension and debarment cases); Sacilotto & Smith,
supra note 16 (discussing trends in enforcement). R
30. See generally STEVEN L. BRIGGERMAN, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS COMPLIANCE HAND-
BOOK § 1:55 (4th ed. 2012).
31. See INTERAGENCY SUSPENSION & DEBARMENT COMM., FY2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE STATUS OF THE FEDERAL SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT SYSTEM 4–5 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter FY2011 REPORT].
32. See id. at 22, app. 3.
33. See, e.g., Schickler v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 264, 272 (Fed. Cl. 2002).
34. See, e.g., Shane Meat Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 800 F.2d 334, 336 (3d Cir.
1986).
35. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, Bribery in International Commerce § 7:28 (Westlaw) (Oct.
2012) (summarizing World Bank debarment procedures).
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enumerated violations, including fraud and bribery.36  The World
Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) initiates an investigation
and report regarding the alleged violation, and delivers its findings
(a “Statement of Accusations and Evidence”) to one of the Bank
Group’s Evaluation and Suspension Officers (EOs).37  The EO, in
turn, reviews the report, and either rejects the INT’s conclusion or
makes a recommendation to the Sanctions Board for a sanction.38
If the EO recommendation is for a debarment in excess of six
months, the contractor is presumptively suspended pending the
Sanctions Board’s review, though the contractor may challenge
that temporary suspension.39  The Sanctions Board will reach an
independent decision regarding the appropriate sanction, and its
decision imposing a sanction will be published.40  The sanctions
decision is not subject to judicial review.41  When the World Bank
sanctions a contractor, that decision is generally binding on the
other multilateral development banks that have entered into the
banks’ multilateral agreement to cross-debar.42  This system of
automatic cross-debarment means, in effect, that a contractor fac-
ing exclusion by the World Bank also faces a significant risk of
cross-debarment by the other multilateral development banks that
have joined this agreement.
As the discussion above reflects, the U.S. and the World Bank
systems differ in important ways.  Those differences appear to stem
from the purpose and context of the two systems.  The U.S. discre-
tionary debarment system is, by design, an informal extension of
the federal contracting process: much as the contracting officer in
any given procurement must assess the prospective contractor’s
36. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK SANCTIONS PROCEDURES § 1.01(a) (Apr. 15, 2012) (“It
is the duty of the World Bank, under its Articles of Agreement, to make arrangements to
ensure that funds provided by the Bank are used only for their intended purposes.  In
furtherance of this duty, the World Bank has established a regime for the sanctioning of
firms and individuals that are found to have engaged in specified forms of fraud and cor-
ruption in connection with Bank-Financed  Projects . . .  This regime protects Bank funds
and serves as a deterrent upon those who might otherwise engage in the misuse of the
proceeds of Bank financing.”) (footnote omitted).
37. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE LEROY & FRANK FARIELLO, THE WORLD BANK GROUP SANC-
TIONS PROCESS AND ITS RECENT REFORMS 3 (2012).
38. See WORLD BANK, supra note 36, arts. II–IV. R
39. Id. § 4.02.
40. See id. §§ 8.01–8.03, 10.01.  The World Bank’s sanctions decisions published since
2011 are available at http://go.worldbank.org/58RC7DVWW0.
41. See, e.g., Karel Wellens, Fragmentation of International Law and Establishing an
Accountability Regime for International Organizations: The Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1159, 1177 n.119 (2004).
42. See Agreement for Mutual Enforcement, supra note 8, para. 4. R
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present responsibility before making a contract award, the U.S.
debarring official must assess the contractor’s broader qualifica-
tions to work on all federal contracts.43  The core inquiry in the
U.S. system is, therefore, on the performance risk posed by the con-
tractor; reputational risk plays a relatively small role, and the system
is expressly not intended to punish contractors’ misdeeds—or, pre-
sumably, to deter misconduct in other contractors.  The World
Bank system, in contrast, appears to be much more strictly struc-
tured, so that the Bank’s many stakeholders can be assured that the
system is objective and accountable.  The World Bank’s system nar-
rowly defines sanctionable acts and leaves much less discretion to
officials to settle with contractors through administrative agree-
ments.  The Bank’s sanctions regime seems to focus not on the per-
formance risk that unqualified and corrupt contractors pose (hardly
surprising, because the Bank does not actually administer contracts
during performance), but rather on mitigating the risks that cor-
ruption will divert development resources and cause the Bank
reputational harm.44
Given the broad differences between the U.S. and World Bank
systems, the question, then, is whether there could be an effective
system of cross-debarment between these two systems.  The discus-
sion below reviews this issue, taking into account the highly diver-
gent perspectives that the various stakeholders may bring to the
issue.
III. POTENTIAL STAKEHOLDERS
While the U.S. and World Bank systems are perhaps the most
likely candidates for cross-debarment, many systems around the
world could, in principle, use debarment decisions from other sys-
tems for investigation and, potentially, exclusion.  The analysis
below assesses how prominent stakeholders might approach this
prospect of cross-debarment.
A. Policymakers and Their Options
For policymakers—members of Congress, for example—the key
question surrounding cross-debarment is what solution, if any, to
43. See FAR 9.402(b) (2011).
44. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., WORLD BANK COUNTRY-LEVEL
ENGAGEMENT ON GOVERNANCE AND ANTICORRUPTION: AN EVALUATION OF THE 2007 STRATEGY
AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN xviii (2011) (“[The World Bank’s] governance and anti-corrup-
tion [efforts have] sought to limit exposure to fraud and corruption risks and also manage
reputational risks to the Bank and borrower governments.”).
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apply.  There appear to be at least four options for consideration,
ranging from maintaining the status quo to giving other systems’
debarment decisions presumptive effect.
1. Do Nothing
For the reasons set forth below, stakeholders (including, espe-
cially, the contractors themselves) may urge policymakers to do
nothing, and simply allow the debarment systems to operate in par-
allel, without cross-debarment.
2. Call for Officials to Consult Other Systems’ Adverse
Information
Alternatively, policymakers could call upon debarring officials to
consider investigative materials and other adverse information pro-
duced in other debarment systems.45  Here, the problems are prac-
tical.  For example, not all debarment systems generate
investigative reports that can be shared readily with others.  While
the World Bank generates and distributes its investigative reports
(with sensitive information redacted) as a regular matter,46 U.S.
debarment officials do not generate similar investigative reports for
distribution.  Where those reports are available, however, they
would offer a useful starting point for investigation by other debar-
ring officials, in other countries.
A second practical problem is how a legislature might compel
debarring officials to consider information from other systems.47  If
debarring officials are to retain discretion, logically adverse con-
tractor information from other systems could be swallowed by that
discretion—a debarring official could simply decide, in the exer-
cise of discretion, not to follow up on adverse information deliv-
ered from another debarring system.  Because of the sensitive
nature of debarment, and the discretion often involved in debar-
ment decisions, legislators are unlikely to narrow that band of dis-
cretion.  Thus, legislators are unlikely to require debarring officials
to take action on adverse information, or to make debarring offi-
45. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 4, at 285 (discussing initiatives to share information R
between debarment systems).
46. WORLD BANK, supra note 36, art. 10; see WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK GROUP SANC- R
TIONS REGIME: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2010).
47. But cf. Courtney Hostetler, Note, Going from Bad to Good: Combating Corporate Cor-
ruption on World Bank-Funded Infrastructure Projects, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 231,
260–61 (2011) (recommending that borrower nations agree, by contract, that a World
Bank corruption investigation will trigger an automatic, reciprocal investigation in the bor-
rower nation).
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cials’ decisions subject to challenge by third parties, such as com-
peting contractors or members of civil society.
Another practical problem is the sheer volume of adverse infor-
mation likely to flow between systems, as the concept of cross-
debarment begins to take hold.  Legislators, for example, might
require debarring officials to establish databases of adverse infor-
mation, which could be accessed by officials in other systems and
could perhaps (though this would be difficult, because of the sensi-
tive nature of investigative information) be reviewed and chal-
lenged by the affected contractors.48
Even with a readier means of sharing information, however,
there would remain the practical problem of which adverse infor-
mation debarring officials should be accountable for reviewing.  If
the city of Paris debars a contractor, for example, should a debar-
ring official in Washington, D.C., be expected to review that infor-
mation?  What if the debarred company is a multinational
corporation, and bribed a number of Indian officials?  When
would the debarring official reasonably be expected to recognize
the materiality of the adverse information?
One approach to resolve these practical problems may be to use
the contract award process as the catalyst for review.  If adverse
information from investigations undertaken in other debarment
systems were available, in some form, to contracting officials as they
considered an award to an affected contractor, the contracting offi-
cial could take that information into account when considering the
qualifications of the contractor and could consult with his or her
debarring official if the adverse information seemed to warrant
possible debarment.  This would square with those procurement
regimes that already require contracting officials to take reasona-
ble account of this sort of adverse information before award.49
This approach—using the award process and the contracting offi-
cial as a gateway to possibly broader review by the debarring offi-
cial—would focus resources, and inquiry, upon those firms that
48. This is the approach currently used for past performance information in the U.S.
federal procurement system.  Contracting officers compile information on contractors’
performance, and information regarding a specific contractor can be accessed, and chal-
lenged, by that affected contractor. See, e.g., FAR 42.15 (2011).
49. See, e.g., Directive 2004/18/EC, art. 45, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 31 March 2004 on the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public
Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, 2004 O.J. (L 134)
114, 120–21 (providing that those convicted of certain crimes, of which the contracting
authority is aware, must be excluded from participation in a public contract); FAR 52.209-5
(2011) (contractor must certify to its present responsibility, including no convictions,
debarments, etc.).
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were actually prospective contractors.  This flexible approach
would also allow contracting and debarring officials to focus their
efforts on those firms that posed the most material risks, based on
local norms and practices—a topic that is discussed in further
detail below.
The preceding discussion reviewed one possible means of mak-
ing cross-debarment work: sharing adverse information, such as
investigative information, between countries and systems, and
allowing contracting officers, as part of the contract award process,
to review that information and potentially to bring it to the atten-
tion of debarring officials.  There are at least two obvious problems
with that approach, however: (1) there is a significant risk that con-
tracting officials will misunderstand or mishandle sensitive investi-
gative information, and (2) it is not clear how prospective
contractors could respond to adverse information, if they could
not (as is almost always the case) be given access to investigative
files.  The following section suggests an alternative, narrower
approach to address these concerns, at least in part.
3. Call for Contracting and Debarring Officials to Take Other
Systems’ Debarment Decisions into Account
Another approach legislators might consider is having con-
tracting officials (in the period preceding contract award) and
debarring officials review debarment actions taken in other systems.
Those debarment actions could be memorialized in central, online
databases, much as there is a central resource on U.S. federal
debarments.  As databases proliferated, they could be linked elec-
tronically, relatively simply, or their review could be made a
mandatory part of contract award procedures.  Because debarment
actions are relatively straightforward and public acts, they would
offer clearer points of reference, without forcing disclosure of sen-
sitive, underlying investigative information.  The databases could,
however, still give contact information for those officials that led an
investigation or debarment action, so that they could be contacted
for background information, if appropriate.  An affected contrac-
tor, moreover, could respond to the prior debarment, perhaps by
offering an excuse or explanation, or (more likely) by describing
the remedial measures taken to resolve the problems that caused
the debarment.  These stakeholders’ concerns are discussed in
greater detail below.
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4. Adopting Other Systems’ Debarment Decisions
Another, more radical approach would simply be to adopt other
systems’ debarment decisions, so that a contractor debarred in one
system would be cross-debarred, automatically, in another, “receiv-
ing” system.  Under this approach, the “receiving” system would
not need any details regarding the original debarment—the debar-
ment itself would trigger the legal bar in the “receiving” system.
The “receiving” system could, of course, allow exceptions to the
automatic debarment, if for example a contracting entity in the
“receiving” procurement system had an urgent need for the goods
or services offered by the debarred contractor.
This type of automatic cross-debarment probably would raise a
number of potential issues for stakeholders, discussed further
below, such as due process concerns for the affected contractors.
In addition, automatic cross-debarment would raise additional
issues for policymakers, as discussed below.
a. Disproportionate Debarment
As noted, different debarment systems focus on different risks.
The U.S. debarment system takes an open-ended approach to
address performance risk and will, under appropriate circum-
stances, tolerate wayward contractors so long as those contractors
have undertaken strong remedial measures.  The World Bank sys-
tem, in contrast, excludes contractors that have violated a defined
set of offenses and focuses less on general performance risk.  If
each of these two systems automatically cross-debarred those debar-
red by the other, each system would likely debar “too many” con-
tractors.  The World Bank would automatically debar contractors
excluded by the U.S. system for contract performance risks that the
World Bank (which is the lender, not the contracting entity) might
otherwise tolerate.  The U.S. system, in contrast, might automati-
cally debar contractors excluded by the World Bank, even if those
contractors had undertaken remedial measures—measures that
might otherwise render the contractors qualified for federal
procurement.
b. Indirect Challenges
Cross-debarment could create new and unforeseen lines of chal-
lenge.  For example, although the World Bank’s debarment deci-
sions are normally (under principles of sovereign immunity)
immune from judicial review, if U.S. agencies automatically cross-
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debarred those excluded by the Bank, those excluded contractors
might use the U.S. courts to challenge the exclusion—in other
words, to bring a judicial challenge to a debarment decision that
would otherwise be immune from review.50
Because costs like these are not obvious or intuitive, policymak-
ers would need careful input from other stakeholders before pro-
ceeding with cross-debarment.  The discussion below reviews other
stakeholders’ likely views in the ongoing policy debate.
B. Civil Society Will Likely Support Cross-Debarment
Members of civil society51 consistently press for broader debar-
ment of corrupt contractors, and they are likely to support cross-
debarment as well.52  Civil society groups favor broader blacklisting
for a wide variety of reasons, of course, but one may be that civil
society lacks the resources to monitor contracting on a day-to-day
basis or to assess the success of contractors’ remedial efforts.
Where a contractor poses a risk of corruption, therefore, civil soci-
ety is likely to press hard for debarment.
50. This scenario already exists for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an inde-
pendent U.S. agency tasked with foreign aid. See MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP., GUIDANCE
ON EXCLUDED PARTIES VERIFICATION PROCEDURES IN MCA ENTITY PROGRAM PROCUREMENTS 1
(2008) (“A firm declared ineligible by The World Bank for any reasons including in accor-
dance with The World Bank Group anti-corruption policies, shall be ineligible to be
awarded an MCC-funded contract during the period of time that the firm is sanctioned by
The World Bank.”).
51. The World Bank offers the following definition of “civil society”:
The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a number
of leading research centers: “the term civil society to refer to the wide array
of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in
public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based
on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations.
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organiza-
tions: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor
unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations,
professional associations, and foundations.”
Defining Civil Society, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/4CE7W046K0 (last updated
Feb. 8, 2013).
52. See, e.g., Transparency Int’l Secretariat, TI Welcomes Multilateral Development Banks’
Commitment to Fight Corruption Together, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.
transparency.org/news/pressrelease/ti_welcomes_multilateral_development_banks_com-
mitment_to_fight_corruption_t (endorsing MDBs’ cross-debarment initiative); Press
Release, Democratic Alliance (Cape Town), South Africa: Blacklist Contractors Responsi-
ble for R50 Billion RDP Housing Failure (Aug. 5, 2012), available at http://allafrica.com/
stories/201208050536.html (South African political party urging debarment of contrac-
tors); Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment System, PROJECT
ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (May 10, 2002), http://pogoarchive.pub30.convio.net/pogo-files/
reports/contract-oversight/federal-contractor-misconduct/co-fcm-20020510.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\45-2\JLE201.txt unknown Seq: 14 22-JUL-13 12:36
232 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 45
As a logical extension of their support for stricter debarment
rules, these same civil society groups are likely to press for cross-
debarment.  Among the options for cross-debarment reviewed
above, the strictest—automatic cross-debarment—may prove the
most attractive for civil society, because members of civil society
also have difficulty assessing or challenging officials’ decisions not
to debar under the more flexible options.  On balance, therefore,
members of civil society are the most likely to press for automatic
cross-debarment.
C. Anti-Corruption Authorities
Officials charged with assessing contractors for suspension and
debarment are less likely, however, to support automatic cross-
debarment.  While automatic debarment would reduce administra-
tive costs, it would also rob suspension and debarment officials of
discretion—the discretion, for example, to accept the risks posed
by a wayward contractor, if the contractor offers unique business
benefits or promises to correct its past mistakes.53  Automatic cross-
debarment would likely put suspension and debarment authorities
in a cross-fire, potentially criticized both by government customers
(who might want more discretion to deal with essential contrac-
tors) and by contractors (who would likely claim that automatic
debarment stripped them of normal due process protections).
For many of the same reasons, investigators and prosecutors
might resist automatic debarment.  Discretionary debarment leaves
officials with leeway and leverage to pressure contractors with
debarment, and so to convince them to cooperate in any investiga-
tion and compensate the government for any damage caused.54
Anti-corruption officials are less likely to squeeze restitution and
other remedies from contractors if debarment is automatic and not
a flexible negotiating tool.  Moreover, automatic cross-debarment
would bypass any system of agency coordination, which might oth-
erwise allow the agency with the greatest interest to “lead” the
debarment discussions.  On balance, therefore, while anti-corrup-
tion officials are likely to support increased publicity about debar-
ment—an enhanced blacklist, in other words—those officials are
unlikely to press hard for automatic cross-debarment.
53. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Zucker & Joseph Fratarcangeli, Administrative Compliance Agree-
ments: An Effective Tool in the Suspension and Debarment Process, 2005 ARMY L. 19, 19.
54. For an interesting discussion of a U.S. agency’s coordination of debarment with
other remedies, see Robbins et al., Path of an Investigation, supra note 16 (discussing debar- R
ment in the U.S. Air Force).
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D. Contracting Agencies
For the reasons touched on above, contracting agencies are
likely to take a dim view of transnational, automatic debarment.
While they would likely welcome information on contractors
debarred elsewhere, especially if the bases for debarment are plain
and accessible, automatic cross-debarment could cut off agencies’
access to important suppliers and contractors.  Buying agencies
would likely insist on retaining discretion to bypass debarment and
to continue to buy, with appropriate safeguards, from especially
important or repentant contractors.
E. Contractors
The last, vital stakeholders in this debate are the contractors
themselves.  They are likely to oppose cross-debarment quite
fiercely, arguing that automatic cross-debarment—which could
result in worldwide debarment, as cross-debarments took effect like
falling dominos across the globe—would deprive them of critical
due process protections.55  Contractors are likely to point out the
obvious differences between debarment systems around the world
and to argue that different systems, with very different standards,
diverge too widely to warrant automatic cross-debarment.  At the
same time, however, contractors are less likely to oppose the next-
lesser option of publishing more information on debarment so
that officials in other jurisdictions can weigh the risk posed by con-
tractors that have been debarred elsewhere.  Contractors are more
likely simply to insist that, when blacklists are published, they fully
explain the bases for debarment so that other authorities can fairly
weigh that information.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the discussion above reflects, while automatic cross-debar-
ment might enhance anti-corruption efforts, cross-debarment is
likely to raise real—and, in most cases, legitimate—concerns in the
affected stakeholder communities.  Stakeholders would more likely
coalesce around a more moderate approach, which ensured that
55. See, e.g., Ralph C. Nash, Suspension and Debarment: Protecting the Government by Deny-
ing Due Process to Contractors, 23 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 102, 103–05, ¶ 36 (2009) (discussing
due process concerns in debarment); Pascale H. Dubois & Aileen E. Nowlan, Global Admin-
istrative Law and the Legitimacy of Sanctions Regimes in International Law, 36 YALE J. INT’L L.
ONLINE 15 (2010) (discussing protections built into World Bank procedures).
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debarments are fully publicized, and that officials in other nations
had due notice of debarments, but which left those officials with
flexibility and discretion in addressing a foreign blacklist.
